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Abstract--The testing of adaptive protection schemes is a 
problem that remains largely unaddressed. These schemes can be 
characterized by uncertainty in behavior due to the dynamic 
changes in their configuration to suit prevailing network 
conditions. This paper proposes a novel approach to formalizing 
this behavior using hybrid systems modeling. This unlocks the 
ability to verify the safety performance of the schemes using 
reachability analysis. In this paper, an adaptive setting selection 
logic for distance protection is verified for its safety, using 
reachability analysis, during changes in network conditions. 
 
Index Terms--Adaptive relaying, distance protection, hybrid 
systems, reachability analysis, performance verification 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ECENT blackouts mainly caused by protection mal-
operation [1, 2] have given impetus to the revision of 
transmission network operator policies and practices when it 
comes to the application and setting of protection schemes [3]. 
A direct result of these is the interest in wide-area monitoring, 
protection and control systems (WAMPAC) and system 
integrity protection systems (SIPS) which can potentially aid 
in mitigating such events [4, 5]. In addition, adaptive 
protection is seen as one of the promising approaches to 
delivering the required protection performance under these 
changing network conditions [6, 7]. By dynamically selecting 
protection settings or re-configuring the scheme logic, 
adaptive protection schemes can effectively respond to varied 
operational conditions while maintaining required 
performance levels. By adapting the protection behavior in 
line with the primary system changes, specified minimum 
performance objectives are ensured. However, it is perceived 
that such behavior introduces uncertainty in the correct choice 
of new configurations. Furthermore, changes in a particular 
scheme may have knock-on effects resulting in an overall un-
coordinated secondary system. 
Despite a number of adaptive protection schemes being 
proposed in the literature for different applications, limited 
attention was given to methods of verifying the scheme 
performance [8]. This is particularly critical as moving away 
from a fixed setting operational paradigm poses difficulties in 
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the management of the protection settings and indeed a barrier 
to adopting such schemes on a wider scale. Performance 
verification can be tackled through a simulation-based 
approach where targeted functional tests of the adaptive 
protection logic can reveal faults in design or implementation. 
This would be an extension of existing closed loop protection 
testing practices [9, 10] which involve creating a set of test 
scenarios and comparing expected and measured performance. 
However, devising a comprehensive set of test scenarios may 
be difficult to fully verify a scheme and oversight may occur. 
Alternatively, more formal methods of verification can be 
used to examine specific properties of the adaptive protection 
behavior in response to defined stimuli. For instance, the 
possibility of the scheme choosing an incorrect setting for a 
specific primary system condition could be evaluated using 
reachability analysis which is explored in this paper. These 
two approaches to performance verification need not be 
mutually exclusive. But can be used as a set of complementary 
procedures to achieve greater confidence in adaptive 
protection behavior [8]. 
Reachability analysis has been proposed to verify the safety 
of power system control and protection actions to maintain its 
stability. For instance, [11] verifies the safety of fault release 
control ± a form of operational tripping scheme. If generator 
disconnection occurs, certain transmission lines are tripped in 
order to avoid angular instability of other generators in the 
network. Generator angular stability limits are used as criteria 
to determine the safe operating region of the power system 
within the state space. Violating these limits results in loss of 
synchronism. In [12], reachability analysis is used to 
determine whether voltage instability occurs as a consequence 
of transmission circuit disconnection. This takes into account 
the automatic voltage control of the generator along with the 
discrete transitions caused by the disconnection of the lines. 
The critical value of the bus voltages determines the safe 
operating region. Voltage stability is also examined in [13] 
where reachability analysis is used to determine the onset of 
voltage instability. Moreover, the paper proposes supervisory 
control to mitigate its effects by issuing a combination of 
voltage control measures as appropriate. At the core of this 
analysis is a hybrid dynamical model which formulates the 
behavior of systems under study using a set of discrete 
abstractions RI WKH V\VWHP¶V VWDWH VSDFH [14]. The resulting 
abstraction is then studied to determine whether the system 
reaches unsafe states which reflect unacceptable performance 
[15]. 
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 The example applications discussed above focus on 
studying the direct impact of protection or control 
performance on the performance of the primary system (e.g. 
impact on stability). Furthermore, the examples are based on 
conventional approaches to protection and control. To this 
end, this paper will examine the use of reachability analysis 
with adaptive approaches to protection to verify the safety 
property of their setting selection logic ± an application not 
considered in the literature. So this paper focuses on the 
interactions, between the primary and secondary systems, 
which trigger adaptation in protection behavior. While 
examining the effectiveness of this approach to adaptive 
protection scheme verification, the following contributions are 
made: 
 
 Extension of the standard hybrid abstraction necessary to 
encompass adaptive protection logic behavior. 
 Novel application of reachability analysis based on the 
PDSSLQJ EHWZHHQ µRSHUDWLRQDO¶ DQG µSHUIRUPDQFH¶
invariant sets of the hybrid state space. 
 
Section II introduces hybrid systems modeling and 
establishes the necessary relations to formulate a working 
behavioral model for adaptive protection applications. Section 
III applies the principles of hybrid modeling to an example 
adaptive distance protection scheme, while defining the safety 
states necessary to perform reachability analysis. Section IV 
demonstrates the use of the developed behavioral model and 
the application of reachability analysis to the adaptive scheme. 
II.  HYBRID MODELING OF POWER SYSTEMS AND PROTECTION 
SCHEMES 
Key to performing effective adaptive scheme verification is 
the understanding of the dynamic behavior of the adaptive 
protection scheme. This involves interactions between the 
primary system, protection relays and overarching adaptive 
protection logic. Describing these interactions is possible 
through hybrid system modeling which describes the 
relationship between the continuous and discrete dynamics of 
a system simultaneously [16, 17]. Continuous dynamics in the 
power system are related to the changes in loading conditions, 
generator outputs, etc. While discrete dynamics are attributed 
to switching events such as circuit breaker operation and 
transformer tap changes. Circuit breaker operation is mainly 
controlled by the applied protection or automation schemes 
which play a major role in the discrete dynamics. By 
examining a protection relay closely, it can also be seen that 
the relay itself exhibits continuous dynamics in the form of the 
protection characteristics. For example, the onset of a short 
circuit condition results in a continuous change in the 
measured current. When this is viewed in conjunction with an 
overcurrent protection characteristic for instance, the relay 
will eventually reach a trip decision in line with the 
continuous evolution of the current. This trip can be thought of 
as a discrete jump (transition) to a new point in the state space. 
A hybrid system  ? takes the form of an automaton that 
describes the different states of the system and at the same 
time captures the discrete events through state transitions. This 
is formulated in (1) [14]: 
  ? ൌ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻ       (1) 
 
Where,  ? ൌሼ ?଴ǡ  ?ଵǡ ǥ ǡ  ?௡ሽǡ  ? א Գ is the set of discrete 
states,  ? ك Թ௡ is the set of continuous states within the set of 
discrete state,  ? ? is the set of control and disturbance inputs 
that influence the dynamic changes in  ?,  ? ? ? ? ك  ? ൈ  ? is the 
set of initial states,  ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻǣ  ? ൈ  ? ՜ Թ௡ is the continuous 
vector field (this defines how the continuous state  ? 
dynamically changes over time),  ? ? ?ሺ ሻǣ  ? ՜  ?௫ is the 
discrete state domain,  ? ك  ? ൈ  ? is the set of edges or 
transition maps (this defines the original state and destination 
state of a transition between two discrete states,  ?ሺ ?ሻǣ  ? ՜  ?௫ 
is the set of transition guard conditions (this defines the 
conditions that must be satisfied before a discrete state 
transition occurs), and  ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻǣ  ? ൈ  ? ՜  ?௑ is the continuous 
vector field reset relation (this defines the new value of the 
continuous state  ? within a new discrete state  ? after a discrete 
transition). 
A.  Primary System Model 
To apply the automaton of (1) in a power system context, 
the general model can be adjusted to deal with the specific 
system being analyzed. In the case of power system stability, 
for instance, the field vector can represent the angular or 
voltage stability dynamics and examples of their formulation 
can be found in [11] and [12] respectively. [18, 19] illustrate 
the transitions between discrete states describing the states of a 
transmission line as a result of protection operation as well as 
the transition between power system operational states. While 
[20] incorporates the action of tap changer into the primary 
system model and its effect on the system voltage profile. In 
this paper, the primary system part of the hybrid system model 
will reflect the mode of operation of a quadrature booster 
transformer (QB). This builds on previous work that evaluates 
the performance impact of QB on distance protection and 
adaptive protection strategies to mitigate this impact [21]. 
B.  Adaptive Protection System Model 
Modeling the interactions between the primary system and 
underlying protection schemes for dynamic analysis was first 
introduced in [22] through the modification of the power 
system admittance matrix as a result of protection action. As 
shown in Figure 1, protection relays encompass a number of 
core elements that deliver the desired functionality. The 
adaptive protection logic illustrated in Figure 1 has direct 
control over the active protection settings by making an 
appropriate selection depending on the primary system 
conditions that are being monitored. Each block can be 
detailed in terms of constituent components (e.g. timers, 
comparators), these have been described in literature [23] and 
mostly have no bearing on the context of this paper. In this 
paper, the main area of concern, in terms of adaptive 
protection, is that the dynamic setting selection based on 
FKDQJHVLQSULPDU\V\VWHPVWDWHLVµVDIH¶. 
  
Figure 1 Adaptive protection scheme elements 
This translates to whether a suitable setting group is 
selected for a given power system condition. In order to verify 
the safety property of this dynamic behavior, reachability 
analysis must be applied. Consequently, the remainder of this 
section develops a working hybrid model for this purpose. The 
influence of the active settings on the output of the protection 
scheme can be described as in (2). 
  ? ൌ  ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?௡ǡ  ?ሻ                (2) 
 
Where  ? is the tripping or signaling output of the 
protection scheme based on the active setting  ?௡, implemented 
scheme logic  ? and scheme input  ? (in the form of measured 
or derived secondary analogues and/or remote signaling or 
binary indications). The adaptive protection logic effectively 
alters the active settings dynamically as in (3). 
  ?௡ ൌ  ?ሺ ?ሻ                  (3) 
 
Where the adaptive protection operator  ? acts on the input  ? to activate the appropriate protection setting  ?௡. Thus  ? can 
simply take the form of one to one mapping between a subset 
of  ?௡ ك  ?௎ and a predetermined settings group  ? ?ك  ?௡ (i.e.  ?ሺ ?ሻǣ  ?௡ ՜  ?௡). Alternatively, the adaptive logic may choose 
an optimum  ?௡ setting based on a calculation algorithm that 
seeks to coordinate multiple protection relays (e.g. automatic 
grading of protection based on established grading methods or 
more advanced methods involving optimization techniques 
[24]). In this paper the focus is on a one to one mapping 
between system states and predetermined settings groups. It is 
clear so far that an adaptive protection scheme involves 
interactions between discrete and continuous dynamics that 
require a formal definition. To achieve this definition, the 
paper proposes to extend the abstraction of these interactions 
based on previous hybrid systems modeling literature. 
C.  Discrete Event System Abstraction 
The interactions between the continuous and discrete 
elements of a hybrid dynamical system can be understood by 
abstracting the continuous dynamics to an equivalent discrete 
system through a discrete event system (DES) abstraction [16, 
25]. This is achieved by introducing interface elements 
between the abstracted continuous system and discrete 
controller usually known as event and action generators. These 
handle information exchanges between the two interacting 
dynamics. In a simple process feedback control system, the 
event generator is representative of the analogue to digital 
converter that sDPSOHV WKH SODQW¶V FRQWUROOHG TXDQWLW\ DQG
passes it on to the controller for processing. The action 
generator is the digital to analogue converter used to apply set 
points to the controlled plant. A standard DES abstraction is 
depicted by the solid blocks and arrows of Figure 2 (DES1). 
However, an adaptive protection scheme exhibits a 
hierarchical structure where the adaptive protection logic 
oversees the conventional protection functions based on the 
primary system state. At the same time, the conventional 
protection scheme operates on the primary system based on its 
state that is being monitored by the instrument transformers 
(or protection signaling). This in effect results in two 
concurrent control loops with different operating time scales 
and simultaneous continuous and discrete state transitions at 
different levels in the hierarchy. The adaptive protection logic 
also requires information from the conventional protection in 
addition to the information from the continuous plant (power 
system). It is important to note that the hierarchy need not be 
physical. This is because the purpose of the abstraction is to 
expose the adaptive logic behavior for verification. Due to 
these factors, existing approaches to the DES abstraction are 
inadequate. To this end, the DES abstraction should be 
extended to encompass the adaptive protection logic as shown 
in Figure 2 by the dashed arrows and blocks (DES2). 
The conventional protection systems will monitor 
continuous primary system quantities  ?ଵᇱሺ ?ሻ. A discrete event  ?෤ଵሾ ?ሿ is generated should these quantities exhibit excursions 
in relation to a certain threshold. In response, the protection 
system produces a trip command  ?ǁଵሾ ?ሿ if the event is in line 
with the active protection setting  ?௡. The associated circuit 
breaker then trips in response to the trip command  ?ଵሺ ?ሻ. 
Similarly, the adaptive protection logic monitors both the 
states of the protection system  ?ଶሺ ?ሻ and the state of the 
primary system (or specified components of it)  ?ଵᇱᇱሺ ?ሻ. Based 
on pre-set thresholds, the events  ?ଶሾ ?ሿ and  ?ଶᇱᇱሾ ?ሿ are 
generated for use by the logic. The adaptive logic then 
determines an appropriate setting  ?ǁଶሾ ?ሿ accordingly and 
activates it in the target relay by means of  ?ଶሺ ?ሻ. This 
developed DES abstraction will be applied to an example 
adaptive distance protection scheme in the following section. 
 
 
Figure 2 DES abstraction for an adaptive protection scheme 
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 III.  APPLYING THE HYBRID MODEL TO ADAPTIVE DISTANCE 
PROTECTION 
In this section, the hybrid systems fundamentals presented 
thus far will be used to model an example adaptive distance 
protection scheme. This example is based on the previous 
work published in [7, 21]. In [21], it has been shown that an 
under reach of protection zones may occur when a quadrature 
booster (QB) transformer is operating in buck or boost modes 
while default distance zone settings are used. An adaptive 
protection strategy has also been presented in [21] to correct 
for this reach error by selecting from pre-determined settings 
groups. This adaptive protection algorithm has been 
experimentally implemented and validated using hardware in 
the loop testing as presented in [7]. The purpose of the 
treatment in this paper is to verify whether the adaptive 
protection used to select between settings groups may operate 
in an unsafe manner. Safety in this context will be defined 
more formally later on and reachability analysis will be the 
means through which this safety property is verified. To 
model the adaptive distance scheme behavior, consider its 
constituent components summarized in Table I. This is in line 
with the developed DES abstraction in Figure 2. The 
performance of the adaptive logic can be determined by 
creating a mapping between the operating states of the listed 
primary and secondary system components. This mapping 
represents the interaction between these subsystems. 
 
Table I 
Summary of hybrid dynamics of studied adaptive distance protection 
DES 
abstraction 
block 
Associated 
system 
component(s) 
Nature of 
component 
dynamics 
Role within the 
system 
Adaptive 
protection logic 
Setting 
selection logic Discrete 
Activation of new 
settings group 
Conventional 
protection 
system 
Distance 
protection 
elements 
Continuous 
Fault detection 
according to active 
settings group 
Programmable 
scheme logic Discrete 
Issue trip command 
after time delay 
Primary power 
system 
QB controller Discrete 
Control and reporting 
of QB mode and tap 
position 
Transmission 
circuit Continuous Line loading status 
Transmission 
circuit breaker Discrete 
Line connection status 
obtained from breaker 
status 
 
It is then proposed that the overall hybrid system is 
partitioned into two invariant discrete sets ୮୮ୱ and ୡ୮ୱ 
which represent the primary power system (pps) and 
conventional protection system (cps) respectively. Invariant 
sets are those where if ሺሻ א  then ሺɒሻ א  ׊ ɒ ൒ . This 
applies to all ሺሻ and ሾሿ defined in the DES abstraction of 
Figure 2. This means that all primary system continuous states ଵሺሻ and conventional protection system continuous states ଶሺሻ are strictly bound by their respective discrete domains ൫୮୮ୱ൯ ك ୮୮ୱ ൈ ଵ and ൫ୡ୮ୱ൯ ك ୡ୮ୱ ൈ ଶ. Thus, 
the discrete states ୮୮ୱ and ୡ୮ୱ are mutually exclusive. 
A.  Defining safety states in the hybrid model 
Prior to performing reachability analysis on the adaptive 
protection logic to verify it safety property, it is necessary to 
define the unsafe states that the logic can potentially reach. 
This will be achieved using the DES abstraction and invariant 
states defined earlier. The partitioning of the hybrid state 
space according to the invariant sets ୮୮ୱ and ୡ୮ୱ can be 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Partitioning of the hybrid state space into invariant sets 
It can be seen that ୮୮ୱ represents the different primary 
system states related to the operation of the QB. Also, ୡ୮ୱ 
reflects the different operational modes of a conventional 
protection relay as dictated by its settings. ୮୮ୱ and ୡ୮ୱ will 
WKHUHDIWHU EH UHIHUUHG WR DV µRSHUDWLRQDO VWDWHV¶ 'LVFUHWH
transitions between the sub-states ୮୮ୱ ك ୮୮ୱ and ୡ୮ୱ كୡ୮ୱ are indicated by . These sub-states must also be, by 
definition, mutually exclusive to ensure that defined safe states 
are unique. Thus, these sub-states also become invariant sets. 
In addition to the operational states, it is now proposed that 
new invariant discrete sets  ?௣ are created and denoted 
µSHUIRUPDQFH VWDWHV¶ 7KHVH SHUIRUPDQFH VWDWHV UHSUHVHQW
unique groupings of operational sub-states. In other words, no 
two sub-states belonging to an operational state share the same 
performance state grouping. For instance, the performance 
VWDWH WKDW JURXSV µ4% EXFN¶ DQG µ$OWHUQDWLYH VHWWLQJ ¶ VXE-
VWDWHVVKDOOQRWLQFOXGHµ'HIDXOWVHWWLQJ¶RUµ4%E\SDVV¶XQGHU
the same grouping. 
The invariant performance sets  ?௣ defined are used to 
identify these unsafe states  ?ك  ?௣. Where  ? denotes an 
unsafe state. In Figure 3, the performance state combining the 
µGHIDXOW VHWWLQJ¶ DQG µ4% ERRVW¶ VWDWHV LV FRQVLGHUHG XQVDIH
since this particular combination results in distance protection 
under reach [21]. As mentioned previously, invariant sets are 
mutually exclusive. Thus, the boundaries of the performance 
states can be clearly defined in the hybrid state space. 
Ultimately, this will result in a clear (binary) indication of 
whether a particular state can be considered safe or not. It is 
important to note that the safety examination in this paper is 
restricted to the correct behaviour of the adaptive logic. As 
such, the implications on unsafe behaviour on the primary 
system (e.g. power system instability) are out with the scope 
of the paper. So, the system should either never exist in an 
unsafe state  ?, expressed as: 
 
ppsQ
T
p[
p[
cpsQ
T
T
T
QB
boost
QB
bypass
QB
buck
Default 
Setting
Alternative 
setting 2
Alternative 
setting 1unsafe 
state
safe state
 ᇝሺሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ ב  ?ሻ                 (4) 
 
:KHUH Ƒ (square) LV WKH µDOZD\V¶ ORJLFDO RSHUDWRU RU
alternatively, the system should eventually always exit the 
unsafe state: 
 
ݔᇝሺሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ ב  ?ሻ                (5) 
 
Where ݔ (diamond) LV WKH µHYHQWXDOO\¶ ORJLFDO operator. 
This temporal aspect reflects the finite amount of time 
required to exit an unsafe state through adaptive protection 
setting changes. For a detailed examination of this temporal 
dimension from a hybrid system perspective, timed hybrid 
automata can be considered. However, this is out with the 
scope of the paper. 
B.  Implementation of the DES abstraction with adaptive 
distance protection 
The adaptive protection logic (excluding distance 
protection elements) is developed in Simulink and the overall 
scheme response was validated in a previous publication using 
a hardware in the loop testing configuration [7]. Simulink 
Stateflow toolbox was used to implement the operational 
states defined above. Additional logic is created to map 
between operational and performance states based on the 
safety definitions for this particular adaptive scheme. Two 
primary system components were considered in this study, the 
QB transformer and the protected transmission line. Their 
respective operational states are shown in Figure 4. The active 
states of the primary system components are determined 
through status indications from the QB controller and circuit 
breakers associated with the line. These status indications 
reflect the  ?ଶᇱᇱሾ ?ሿǡ  ?ଶሾ ?ሿ signals of the DES abstraction. The 
loading of the line is used to determine the impact of potential 
load encroachment on the behavior of the adaptive protection 
logic. Heavily loaded lines are more likely to cause load 
encroachment related mal-operation of distance protection. 
Thus, the adaptive logic must take this into account. Other 
phenomena such as power swings are not considered as this is 
dealt with by dedicated distance protection functionality 
(power swing blocking) and does not trigger any setting 
changes by the adaptive logic nor is impacted by zone reach, 
thus it is not being verified here. 
 
 
Figure 4 QB and protected line operational states 
IV.  APPLYING REACHABILITY ANALYSIS TO ADAPTIVE 
DISTANCE PROTECTION 
In this section, the reachability analysis methodology is 
described and demonstrated for an example adaptive distance 
protection scheme previously developed in [7, 26]. As 
explained earlier, the reachability analysis aims to uncover 
erroneous behavior in the adaptive setting selection logic. This 
is achieved by ascertaining whether the adaptive scheme that 
is modeled in a hybrid state space reaches an unsafe state 
during its operation. A particular example of this is the 
potential under reach in distance protection zones if a QB is 
installed in the circuit and operated in boost or buck modes. If 
WKHDGDSWLYHORJLFZDVµHUURUIUHH¶WKHQWKLVXQGHUUHDFKFDQEH
mitigated by dynamically extending the zone reach. Dynamic 
extension of zone reach is realized by selecting a different 
setting group with the desired zone reach setting. Given the 
initial conditions  ? ? ? ? for a hybrid system  ?, the reach of the 
hybrid system can be described as: 
  ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?ሻ ൌ ሼ ?׊ ? ? ? ? كሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ׌ ?ீҧ ǡ  ?Ǥ  ?Ǥ  ?ك  ?௣ሽ  (6) 
 
This implies that should the system reach an unsafe state 
from a certain  ? ? ? ?ǡ then it is possible to identify the 
backwards trajectory obtained from the unsafe transition  ?ீ. 
This can be used to identify faults in the adaptive logic, by 
observing the scheme inputs and the resulting adaptive logic 
state transitions leading to the unsafe state entry. The 
performance states that represent the unsafe states 
 ك Ɍ୮ are 
summarised in Table II. This shows the condition for entry in 
to and exit from unsafe states. These conditions are qualified 
by  ?ଶᇱᇱሾ ?ሿǡ  ?ଶሾ ?ሿ of the DES abstraction. In Table II,  ? ?௕௞,  ? ?௕௧  and  ? ?௕௣ represent QB buck, boost and bypass modes 
respectively which are also operational invariant sets in the 
developed DES abstraction. Also,  ? ?ଵ to  ? ?ସ represent the 
used settings group 1 to 4 respectively (these are summarized 
in Table III along with selection criteria). The zone reaches are 
expressed in the percentage of the protected line length. 
As discussed earlier, the potential for load encroachment is 
taken in to account. Under stressed conditions, the protection 
should be geared towards security as opposed to 
dependability, thus the adaptive logic temporarily inhibits 
zone extension under heavy loading conditions. The level of 
line current at which load encroachment is likely is indicted by  ?௘௡௖  in Table II. This threshold is determined by simulation 
and varies with the power system under consideration. 7KHµȁ¶
RSHUDWRU LQGLFDWHV $1' ORJLF DQG WKH µ¶ RSHUDWRU LQGLFDWHV
the complement of a state. 
 
Table II 
Safety conditions for adaptive logic under test ࡳ Entry conditions Exit Conditions 
Under-reach  ? ?௕௞ȁ ? ?ଵ  ? ?௕௣ȁ ? ?ଷ 
Under-reach  ? ?௕௧ȁ ? ?ଵ  ? ?௕௣ȁ ? ?ସ 
Over-reach  ? ?௕௣ȁ ? ?ଵ  ? ?௕௧ȁ ? ?௕௞ȁ ? ?ଵ 
Load-encroachment  ?௘௡௖ȁ ? ?ଵ  ?௘௡௖ȁ ? ?ଵ 
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 Table III 
Setting group assignment ࡿࡳ Reach Settings Selection criteria 
SG1 Zone 1  = 80%, Zone 2 = 150%, Zone 3 = 220%  ? ?௕௣ǡ  ?௘௡௖ 
SG2 Not used - 
SG3 Zone 1  = 80%, Zone 2 = 160%, Zone 3 = 230%  ? ?௕௧ǡ  ?௘௡௖ 
SG4 Zone 1  = 80%, Zone 2 = 170%, Zone 3 = 250%  ? ?௕௞ ǡ  ?௘௡௖ 
 
In light of this, a safety performance verification procedure 
based on reachability analysis is proposed and is shown in 
Figure 5. As shown in the figure, the hybrid system state space 
is determined including the definition of the safety criteria. 
The adaptive logic must then be stimulated by changing the 
state of the primary system components of interest. In this 
case, the QB state must be changed as this has a direct impact 
on the adaptive setting selection logic behavior being verified. 
The performance states are then directly obtained to determine 
whether an unsafe state has been reached. If an unsafe state is 
reached, then it can be concluded that an error is present in the 
logic which can be diagnosed by monitoring the trajectory  ?ீ 
leading to the unsafe state. This trajectory will infer the 
conditions  ?ଶᇱᇱሾ ?ሿǡ  ?ଶሾ ?ሿ that led to the unsafe state entry. 
 
 
Figure 5 Reachability analysis procedure 
Once the DES abstraction has been developed, the discrete 
transitions between the system states in the hybrid system can 
be determined without incorporating the primary system 
continuous states. This is because  ?ଶᇱᇱሾ ?ሿǡ  ?ଶሾ ?ሿ are known for 
each QB and circuit loading state. In other words, the primary 
system model continuous dynamics become redundant in the 
reachability analysis. As such, computational resources are 
saved. This is an important differentiator between the 
reachability analysis approach proposed in this paper 
compared to the literature referred to earlier. 
V.  TEST SETUP AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
The hybrid models reachability analysis methodology 
developed in the previous section will be used to verify the 
performance of adaptive distance protection applied to 
transmission lines with quadrature booster transformers (QBs) 
installed. The overall test setup is shown in Figure 6. Inputs to 
the adaptive protection logic include signals representing QB 
states and protected line loading. Both inputs and adaptive 
logic response (i.e. setting group selection) are monitored to 
verify the logic safety. Note that no distance protection 
elements are implemented, as the verification focuses on the 
adaptive logic behavior that governs new setting selection. 
 
Figure 6 Reachability analysis test setup 
A.  Primary System Model 
The power system under consideration is shown in Figure 7 
(model data is shown in Table IV). It consists of four 400kV 
circuits of 200km each. The purpose of the model is to 
generate line loading data as inputs to the test. The distance 
protection scheme (including adaptive logic) under 
examination is located at A in Figure 7 (denoted by ANSI 21). 
There are two operating conditions that are of interest from the 
adaptive logic point of view that result in reaching an unsafe 
state ± the impact of the QB status on the distance protection 
reach and the possibility of load encroachment while zone 3 is 
extended by the adaptive logic. 
 
 
Figure 7 Primary system under test 
Table IV  
Power System Model Data 
Line Impedances 
(primary ohms) 
Line 
Configuration 
CT, VT Ratios 
Z1 = 0.027+j0.296 
NP 
Four single 
circuit segments 
CT ratio = 
1000:1A 
Z0 = 0.1+j0.439 
NP 
Segment length 
= 200km  
VT ratio = 
400k:110V 
B.  Adaptive Protection Strategy 
The function of the adaptive distance protection logic is to 
choose an appropriate zone reach from predetermined settings 
groups in response to changes in the QB mode. This also takes 
into account the loading of the line. The adaptive logic refrains 
from extending the zone reach should load encroachment 
become a potential issue due to circuit overloading. Figure 8 
shows how load encroachment can occur if line CD in the test 
model is disconnected. Adaptive extension of the third zone to 
compensate for the presence of the QB under this 
circumstance would be undesirable. In this case, the scheme 
defaults to the original settings group as a best compromise. 
The line current leading to this situation is captured from the 
simulation and fed into the Simulink model as an input to the 
adaptive logic. The adaptive protection algorithm is detailed 
by the authors in [7, 21]. The settings groups used have been 
presented in Table III. 
C.  Verification of Adaptive Logic Safety 
The QB state inputs to the logic were in the form of 
pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) representing different 
QB operating modes.  
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Figure 8 Load impedance prior and post load encroachment (secondary ohms) 
This is shown in Figure 9 DV µ4% FRQQHFWLRQ¶ DQG µ4%
PRGH¶ The PRBS is obtained from the signal generator block 
in Simulink. The use of the PRBS is considered as an effective 
means of providing exhaustive coverage for possible system 
executions and repeatability of testing conditions [27]. 
Furthermore, hysteresis in the logic can be discovered when 
using this approach. An increase in line current (secondary 
value) occurs at 25s in the simulation to reflect the load 
encroachment scenario (i.e. disconnection of line CD). 
The different performance states  ?௣ that the adaptive 
scheme resides in after subjecting the logic to the inputs are 
also shown in Figure 9. These arH WKH µUHDFK VWDWHV¶ DQG WKH
µORDG HQFURDFKPHQW VWDWHV¶ 7KHVH SHUIRUPDQFH VWDWHV DUH
HQXPHUDWHGDVµXQGHUUHDFK¶µRYHUUHDFK¶DQGµQRUPDOUHDFK¶
IRU WKH IRUPHU DQG µHQFURDFKPHQW SRVVLEOH¶ DQG µQR
HQFURDFKPHQW¶ IRU WKH ODWWHU7KHERWWRP WUDFH LQ Figure 9 is 
set to unsafe if any of the above performance states satisfies 
the conditions for an unsafe state (defined in Table II) and vice 
versa. 
It can be seen from the bottom trace in Figure 9 that the 
adaptive logic alternates between safe and unsafe states. 
However, it only resides in an unsafe state for a short period of 
time. This corresponds to the simulation time step (1ms) 
which is the maximum amount of time necessary to reach a 
setting selection decision. In reality, this time delay will 
increase depending on the scheme implementation. Between 
25-50s, the increased line current value results in the logic 
reverting to the default setting (SG1) regardless of the QB 
mode. This is because the logic recognizes that the increase in 
line loading beyond the  ?௘௡௖ threshold will result in load 
encroachment, so dynamically extending zone 3 is inhibited. 
This situation remains the same regardless of the QB state 
until the end of the simulation time. Thus, inhibiting zone 
extension during heavy line loading conditions is deemed safe. 
An intentional logic error was then introduced to the 
adaptive logic to disable its load encroachment related 
response, and the same inputs were used to stimulate the logic. 
This means that the logic would not inhibit zone extension 
even under heavy line loading conditions. The purpose of this 
test is to determine whether the reachability analysis would 
identify a genuine unsafe state (i.e. not a temporary one while 
awaiting setting change). The related analysis results are 
shown in Figure 10. The increase in load current through the  
 
Figure 9 Inputs and performance of adaptive logic indicated by safe states 
 
 
Figure 10 Error introduced in the adaptive logic results in unsafe zone 
extension 
protected line AB, combined with zone extensions prompted 
by the QB mode changes result in an unsafe state entry. This is 
indicated in Figure 10 at several occurrences after 25s where 
the logic dwells in an unsafe state for longer than a simulation 
time step (the maximum amount of time required to select a 
new setting group). In this case, the logic error is known 
because it was intentionally introduced for testing purposes. In 
practical situations, unsafe state indications would be used by 
the testing engineer to diagnose the erroneous logic by 
determining the conditions that led to the unsafe state entry. 
D.  Discussion of reachability analysis in light of results 
So long as the power system state can be inferred from a set 
of discrete transitions, then explicit continuous space 
computations will not be necessary. However, this assumes 
that the evolution of the continuous primary system state is  
not influenced by the outcome of the logic decision. Given the 
scope of the verification, this assumption is valid. This is 
because the verification is being conducted to determine 
whether logic actions are safe based on the consequences of an 
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 unsafe outcome. And these unsafe outcomes have been 
determined using the performance states  ?௣. The temporal 
dimension of reachability analysis is also of relevance. It is 
necessary to identify the maximum time period that an 
adaptive protection scheme requires to provide a decision. 
Otherwise the scheme may become vulnerable to mal-
operation if changes in the primary system occur during this 
time period. Thus, further work is necessary to incorporate the 
temporal dimension into the hybrid model and consequent 
reachability analysis. 
Finally, the verification approach has proven to be flexible 
as it does not require the inclusion of conventional protection 
behavior and is independent of logic implementation. Indeed, 
the same analysis can be integrated in hardware in the loop 
validation procedure for overall scheme testing. This is only 
true if the invariant performance sets and associated safety 
states are defined based on the hybrid system interactions that 
trigger the adaptation of settings, as well as an understanding 
of the impact of adaptive setting changes on the performance 
of protection elements. 
E.  Application of safety verification to other adaptive 
protection schemes 
The approach to safety verification in essence requires the 
identification of unsafe states ± a subset of the performance 
states developed in this paper. These states are determined 
based on the defined continuous and discrete interactions 
between constituent components of the scheme. It can then be 
said that a foundation has been laid for applying the safety 
verification (reachability analysis) technique to other types of 
adaptive protection schemes. Unfortunately, implementing and 
testing of other schemes is out with the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, the following points can be made as guidelines 
for conducting reachability analysis under such circumstances: 
 
 The distance protection considered in this paper is based 
on a mho characteristic. Should a different characteristic 
be used (e.g. quadrilateral), then determining the required 
alterations to the characteristic to minimize the impact of 
reach errors should be considered when designing the pool 
of settings. Verification of the setting selection logic 
should then follow the same procedure presented thus far. 
 There have been numerous examples of adaptive distance 
protection schemes proposed in the literature to deal with 
different performance issues. Some of which are not based 
on dynamically changing settings, but on less deterministic 
approaches such as fuzzy logic [28]. In such cases, 
reachability analysis may still be applicable provided that a 
relationship between the input and output of the logic can 
be determined. Moreover, such schemes are only tested 
using a large set of fault scenarios ± an approach whose 
drawbacks have been discussed in the introduction of this 
paper. Thus, reachability analysis can be a powerful 
complementary approach to the verification of such 
VFKHPH¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This paper presented and demonstrated a novel application 
of reachability analysis to verify the performance of adaptive 
distance protection setting selection logic. A redefined discrete 
abstraction of the hybrid system which represents the 
interactions between the primary system and adaptive 
protection was formulated. This modification was necessary to 
capture the full control hierarchy introduced by the 
measurements and actions of adaptive logic. By partitioning 
the hybrid system state space into invariant operational and 
performance sets, it was possible to exclude the continuous 
dynamics from the analysis while clearly defining the 
boundaries of the safety states of the system. 
The practical utilization of the safety verification would be 
of interest to manufacturers and utilities dealing with adaptive 
protection. Although protection scheme developers can 
directly apply such verification methodologies on their 
adaptive algorithms, utility commissioning engineers require 
meaningful performance metrics without delving into the 
intricacies of system behavioral modeling. As such, it is 
important to migrate such methodologies into tools and 
processes that meet usability requirements of end users. 
REFERENCES 
[1] A. Atputharajah and T. K. Saha, "Power system blackouts - 
literature review," in Industrial and Information Systems (ICIIS), 
2009 International Conference on, 2009, pp. 460-465. 
[2] S. H. Horowitz and A. G. Phadke, "Blackouts and relaying 
considerations - Relaying philosophies and the future of relay 
systems," Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, vol. 4, pp. 60-67, 
2006. 
[3] US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, "Final Report on 
the August 14th Blackout in the United States and Canada," 2004. 
[4] V. Terzija, G. Valverde, C. Deyu, P. Regulski, V. Madani, J. Fitch, 
et al., "Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control of Future 
Electric Power Networks," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 99, pp. 
80-93, 2011. 
[5] M. Begovic, V. Madani, and D. Novosel, "System Integrity 
Protection Schemes (SIPS)," in 2007 iREP Symposium - Bulk 
Power System Dynamics and Control - VII. Revitalizing 
Operational Reliability, 2007, pp. 1-6. 
[6] D. Tholomier and A. Apostolov, "Adaptive protection of 
transmission lines during wide area disturbances," in Power 
Systems Conference and Exposition, 2009. PSCE '09. IEEE/PES, 
2009, pp. 1-7. 
[7] I. Abdulhadi, F. Coffele, A. Dysko, C. Booth, and G. Burt, 
"Adaptive protection architecture for the smart grid," in 2011 2nd 
IEEE PES International Conference and Exhibition on Innovative 
Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT Europe), 2011, pp. 1-8. 
[8] I. Abdulhadi, F. Coffele, A. Dysko, C. Booth, G. Burt, G. Lloyd, et 
al., "Performance Verification and Scheme Validation of Adaptive 
Protection Schemes," in 2012 CIGRÉ Session (44th Edition), 2012. 
[9] Alstom, Network Protection and Automation Guide - Protective 
Relays, Measurement and Control, 2011. 
[10] IEEE, "IEEE Std C37.233-2009: IEEE Guide for Power System 
Protection Testing," pp. 1-112, 2009. 
[11] Y. Susuki, T. Sakiyama, T. Ochi, T. Uemura, and T. Hikihara, 
"Verifying fault release control of power system via hybrid system 
reachability," in Power Symposium, 2008. NAPS '08. 40th North 
American, 2008, pp. 1-6. 
[12] Y. Susuki and T. Hikihara, "Predicting Voltage Instability of 
Power System via Hybrid System Reachability Analysis," in 
American Control Conference, 2007. ACC '07, 2007, pp. 4166-
4171. 
[13] R. R. Negenborn, A. G. Beccuti, T. Demiray, S. Leirens, G. 
Damm, B. De Schutter, et al., "Supervisory hybrid model 
predictive control for voltage stability of power networks," in 
 American Control Conference, 2007. ACC '07, 2007, pp. 5444-
5449. 
[14] E. M. Navarro-López and R. Carter, "Hybrid automata: an insight 
into the discrete abstraction of discontinuous systems," 
International Journal of Systems Science, pp. 1-16, 2010. 
[15] C. J. Tomlin, I. Mitchell, A. M. Bayen, and M. Oishi, 
"Computational techniques for the verification of hybrid systems," 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 91, pp. 986-1001, 2003. 
[16] X. D. Koutsoukos, P. J. Antsaklis, J. A. Stiver, and M. D. 
Lemmon, "Supervisory control of hybrid systems," Proceedings of 
the IEEE, vol. 88, pp. 1026-1049, 2000. 
[17] Y. Susuki, T. J. Koo, H. Ebina, T. Yamazaki, T. Ochi, T. Uemura, 
et al., "A Hybrid System Approach to the Analysis and Design of 
Power Grid Dynamic Performance," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 
100, pp. 225-239, 2012. 
[18] G. K. Fourlas, K. J. Kyriakopoulos, and C. D. Vournas, "Hybrid 
systems modeling for power systems," Circuits and Systems 
Magazine, IEEE, vol. 4, pp. 16-23, 2004. 
[19] G. K. Fourlas, "Modeling of an electrical power transmission 
system using hybrid systems," in Control Applications, 2005. CCA 
2005. Proceedings of 2005 IEEE Conference on, 2005, pp. 1516-
1521. 
[20] I. A. Hiskens and M. A. Pai, "Hybrid systems view of power 
system modelling," in Circuits and Systems, 2000. Proceedings. 
ISCAS 2000 Geneva. The 2000 IEEE International Symposium on, 
2000, pp. 228-231 vol.2. 
[21] I. F. Abdulhadi, G. M. Burt, A. Dysko, R. Zhang, and J. Fitch, 
"The evaluation of distance protection performance in the presence 
of Quadrature Boosters in support of a coordinated control 
strategy," in Developments in Power System Protection (DPSP 
2010). Managing the Change, 10th IET International Conference 
on, 2010, pp. 1-5. 
[22] L. G. Perez, A. J. Flechsig, and V. Venkatasubramanian, 
"Modeling the protective system for power system dynamic 
analysis," Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, pp. 1963-
1973, 1994. 
[23] A. Dysko, J. R. McDonald, G. M. Burt, J. Goody, and B. Gwyn, 
"Integrated Modelling Environment: a platform for dynamic 
protection modelling and advanced functionality," in 1999 IEEE 
Transmission and Distribution Conference, 1999, pp. 406-411 
vol.1. 
[24] P. P. Bedekar, S. R. Bhide, and V. S. Kale, "Optimum coordination 
of overcurrent relays in distribution system using genetic 
algorithm," in International Conference on Power Systems, 2009. 
ICPS '09, 2009, pp. 1-6. 
[25] M. Yasar, A. Beytin, G. Bajpai, and H. G. Kwatny, "Integrated 
Electric Power System supervision for reconfiguration and damage 
mitigation," in IEEE Electric Ship Technologies Symposium, 2009. 
ESTS 2009, 2009, pp. 345-352. 
[26] J. Kincaid, I. Abdulhadi, A. S. Emhemed, and G. M. Burt, 
"Evaluating the Impact of Superconducting Fault Current Limiters 
on Distribution Network Protection Schemes," in Universities' 
Power Engineering Conference (UPEC), Proceedings of 2011 46th 
International, 2011, pp. 1-5. 
[27] M. G. Bartley, D. Galpin, and T. Blackmore, "A comparison of 
three verification techniques," 2002. 
[28] M. Sanaye-Pasand and P. Jafarian, "An Adaptive Decision Logic 
to Enhance Distance Protection of Transmission Lines," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 26, pp. 2134-2144, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ibrahim Abdulhadi 6¶ 0¶ received the 
M.Eng. and PhD degrees in electronic and electrical 
engineering from the University of Strathclyde, 
UK, in 2007 and 2013. He is currently a Research 
Associate ZLWKLQ WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V ,QVWLtute for 
Energy and Environment. He has experience 
working for UK distribution and transmission 
network operators. His research interests include 
power system protection, real-time power system 
simulation, hardware in the loop testing and 
communications applications in smart grids. 
 
$GDP '\ĞNR 0¶06) received the M.Sc. degree 
IURP WKH7HFKQLFDO8QLYHUVLW\RIàyGĨ3RODQG LQ
1990, and the PhD degree from the University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow, U.K., in 1998. Currently, he 
is a Lecturer in the Department of Electronic and 
Electrical Engineering, University of Strathclyde. 
His main research interest areas are power system 
modeling and simulation, power system protection 
and power quality. 
 
Graeme Burt (M'95) received the B.Eng. and PhD 
degrees from the University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow, U.K. He is a professor within the 
Department of Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering at the University of Strathclyde, where 
he co-directs the Institute for Energy and 
Environment and he is the director of the Rolls-
Royce University Technology Centre in Electrical 
Power Systems. His international activities include 
serving on the board of the Association of European 
Distributed Energy Resources Laboratories 
(DERlab e.V.), and collaborating in EU programs 
including the Distributed Energy Resources Research Infrastructure (DERri), 
and the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) in Smart Grids. 
